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STORAGE WARS: ANALYZING THE 
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE SCA’S 
WARRANT PROVISION 
Peter Liskanich* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Technological innovation has historically forced the expansion of 
substantive law. For example, industrialization and the expansion of 
railroad systems led to major expansions in property law, tort law, and 
employment law, while the creation of the printing press prompted the 
development of copyright law.1 But laws and regulations generally do 
not keep pace with the rate of technological change. Today, 
technology is evolving at a faster pace than ever before and legislators 
are struggling to keep up. As Professor Vivek Wadhwa points out, 
regulatory gaps exist, and as technology advances ever more rapidly, 
those gaps grow increasingly wider.2 
The driving force behind innovation of the Digital Age has been 
the observed growth in computer processing power, which doubles 
nearly every two years.3 The exponential growth in the capacity of 
computer processors has had a particularly profound effect on the 
expansion of the internet. According to data published by the World 
Bank, the percentage of the world’s population with access to the 
internet has increased from less than two percent in 1996 to over forty-
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 1. Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-
with-technology. 
 2. Id. 
 3. David Frideman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 
81 (2002). 
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three percent in 2015.4 Today, more than three billion people use the 
internet and that number continues to grow exponentially.5 
In 1986, under Title II of the larger Electronic Communication 
Privacy Act, Congress created the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA” or the “Act”) which “protects the privacy of the contents of 
files stored by service providers and of records held about the 
subscriber by service providers.”6 In 1986, the internet was still in its 
infancy; the drafters of the SCA had no way to foresee that 
multinational companies would be able to store vast amounts of digital 
content and easily transfer such information across borders at 
lightning speed.7 Thirty years later, the internet has evolved from a 
collection of small networks into a global system for electronically 
transmitting communications, while the laws regulating the protection 
of those communications have remained the same. 
This Comment will argue that the Second Circuit correctly 
applied the relevant provisions of the SCA to the facts of a recent case 
involving Microsoft—Microsoft Corp. v. United States—8but that 
there is no reasonable interpretation of the SCA as it currently stands 
that would adequately balance the legitimate needs of U.S. law 
enforcement and the privacy interests of U.S. citizens. Part II of this 
Comment will describe the facts of Microsoft Corp. Part III will 
examine the Second Circuit’s application of the SCA. Part IV will 
analyze the merits of the Court’s reasoning and discuss the practical 
implications of the Court’s decision, including the consequences that 
might have followed from an opposite interpretation of the SCA. 
Finally, this Comment will discuss the merits of several proposed 
legislative and policy reforms. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Microsoft Corporation operates a “web-based e-mail service” 
known as Outlook.com.9 In providing users with web-based access to 
e-mail accounts, Microsoft saves each user’s e-mail information and 
 
 4. Internet Users (Per 100 People), WORLD BANK GRP. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2. 
 5. Steve Dent, There Are Now 3 Billion Internet Users, Mostly In Rich Countries, ENGADGET 
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.engadget.com/2014/11/25/3-billion-internet-users. 
 6. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
 7. Id. at 226 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
        8.   829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 9. Id. at 202 (majority opinion). 
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content on a network of servers located in massive datacenters 
operated by Microsoft and its subsidiaries.10 Microsoft oversees more 
than one hundred datacenter facilities across more than forty countries 
and hosts more than 200 online services, used by over one billion 
customers and over twenty million businesses around the globe.11 In 
an effort to reduce network latency, Microsoft typically stores a 
customer’s e-mail information and content at a datacenter located near 
the physical locale identified by the user as its own when subscribing 
to the service.12 However, Microsoft does not verify the accuracy of 
the user-provided information before its systems migrate the data 
according to company protocol.13 
Once the user’s content has been transferred to a foreign 
datacenter, Microsoft removes nearly all of the information associated 
with the account from its U.S.-based servers, retaining only basic 
account information and some non-content e-mail information in its 
U.S. facilities.14 While Microsoft maintains that user data stored in 
Dublin is only accessible from the Dublin datacenter, Microsoft’s 
database management program allows it to retrieve account data 
stored on any of its servers globally from its offices in the United 
States.15 
In Microsoft Corp., a magistrate judge for the Southern District 
of New York issued a Search and Seizure Warrant under section 2703 
of the Stored Communications Act, directing Microsoft to seize and 
produce the contents of an e-mail account that it maintains for one of 
its customers.16 The judge found probable cause to believe the account 
was being used in furtherance of narcotics trafficking.17 However, due 
to jurisdictional limitations, Microsoft moved to quash the warrant to 
the extent that it required Microsoft to produce the contents of the 
customer’s e-mail account stored on a server located in its Dublin 
datacenter.18 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 202–03. 
 12. Id. at 202. 
 13. Id. at 203. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 204. 
 18. Id.  
50.3 LISKANICH (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018  4:24 PM 
540 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:537 
In support of its motion to quash, Microsoft referred to 
Congress’s use of the term “warrant” to identify the instrument 
authorized under the Act, because “[w]arrants traditionally carry 
territorial limitations.”19 Microsoft cited 41(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure to support its position that a court-issued warrant 
permits law enforcement agencies “to seize items at locations in the 
United States and in United States-controlled areas . . . but their 
authority generally does not extend further.”20 Conversely, the 
government attached little importance to the instrument’s label. 
Instead, the government argued that the scope of a warrant under the 
SCA is more akin to that of a subpoena, which “requires the recipient 
to deliver records, physical objects, and other materials to the 
government no matter where those documents are located, so long as 
they are subject to the recipient’s custody or control.”21 
The magistrate judge, affirmed by the district court, denied 
Microsoft’s motion to quash and concluded that Microsoft was 
obligated to produce the customer’s content, “wherever it might be 
stored.”22 The judge likened the instrument to a subpoena, rather than 
a traditional warrant, on the ground that an SCA warrant does not 
involve government officials entering the premises of the internet 
service provider to seize the relevant email account.23 Accordingly, 
the magistrate judge determined that Congress intended the Act’s 
warrant provisions to incorporate obligations similar to those 
associated with a subpoena and therefore held that Microsoft was 
required to produce information in its possession or under its control, 
irrespective of its location.24 
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court’s ruling and concluded that the SCA does not authorize a U.S. 
court to issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United 
States-based service provider to obtain the contents of a customer’s 
electronic communications stored on servers located abroad.25 
 
      19.   Id. at 201. 
 20. Id. (citation omitted). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 204. 
 23. Id. (citation omitted). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 222. 
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III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Second Circuit emphasized the strong presumption against 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, given that “the SCA is silent 
as to the reach of the statute as a whole and as to the reach of its 
warrant provisions in particular.”26 When interpreting the laws of 
Congress, courts presume that such laws are intended to “apply only 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless a contrary 
intent clearly appears.”27 Here, the court followed the two-prong 
approach set forth in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.28 to 
decide whether the presumption against extraterritoriality forbids the 
proposed application of the SCA.29 First, the court must first look to 
the plain language of the statute to determine whether Congress 
intended it to have extraterritorial effect.30 Second, if congressional 
intent is not found in the plain language of the statute, the court must 
rely on common canons of statutory construction to “identify[] the 
statute’s focus,” and determine whether, based on the facts, the 
challenged application is unlawfully “extraterritorial.”31 
A.  Prong 1: The Plain Language of the SCA 
In Microsoft Corp., the Court first analyzed whether the plain 
language of the SCA contemplates extraterritorial application.32 The 
Court readily determined that the SCA’s provisions permitting a 
service provider’s disclosure in response to a duly obtained warrant do 
not mention any extraterritorial application.33 Moreover, the 
government was unable to point to any provision that even implicitly 
alluded to such application.34 
Turning to the legal significance of the term “warrant,” the court 
indicated that a legal term of art is to be interpreted “in accordance 
with [its] traditional legal meaning, unless the statute contains a 
persuasive indication that Congress intended otherwise.”35 Here, the 
court explained that “warrants and subpoenas are, and have long been, 
 
 26. Id. at 209. 
 27. Id. at 210 (citation omitted). 
 28. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 29. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 210 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255). 
      30.   Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 211. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 212. 
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distinct legal instruments”36 and that “[s]ection 2703 of the SCA 
recognizes this distinction and, unsurprisingly, uses the ‘warrant’ 
requirement to signal . . . a greater level of protection to priority stored 
communications, and ‘subpoenas’ to signal (and provide) a lesser 
level.”37 The court highlighted the fact that the statute explicitly refers 
to both instruments and yet it “does not use the terms interchangeably 
. . . [n]or does it use the word ‘hybrid’ to describe a Stored 
Communications Act warrant.”38 Thus, the court found no reasonable 
basis to infer that Congress intended a warrant under the SCA to 
function as a subpoena.39 
B.  Prong 2: Statutory Construction 
The second prong of the approach, set forth in Morrison, requires 
a court to examine the “‘territorial events or relationships’ that are the 
‘focus’ of the relevant statutory provision.”40 According to the court 
in Morrison, “[i]f the domestic contacts presented by the case fall 
within the ‘focus’ of the statutory provision or are ‘the objects of the 
statute’s solicitude,’ then the application of the provision is not 
unlawfully extraterritorial.”41 Here, the Second Circuit relied on 
several common canons of statutory construction to support its 
conclusion that the “focus” of the SCA’s warrant provision was to 
protect the privacy of stored communications.42 
1.  The Plain Meaning of the Text in the SCA 
First, the court referred to the plain meaning of the text in the 
Act’s warrant provision. The court pointed out that “[w]arrants under 
Section 2703 [are issued] under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, whose Rule 41 is undergirded by the Constitution’s 
protections of citizens’ privacy against unlawful searches and 
seizures.”43 The court also called attention to the fact that the warrant 
language in section 2703 appears in a statute entitled the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, “suggesting privacy as a key 
 
 36. Id. at 214. 
 37. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A)). 
 38. Id. (citation omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 216 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010)). 
 41. Id. (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267). 
 42. Id. at 217. 
 43. Id. 
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concern.”44 Thus, the court concluded, the language of both the SCA’s 
warrant provision and the act as a whole suggest that the privacy of 
the stored communications is the “object of the statute’s solicitude” 
and “the focus of its provisions.”45 
2.  The Structure of the SCA 
The Court also cited the statute’s structure as a major indicator of 
the Act’s focus on the need to protect users’ privacy interests.46 The 
court explained that the SCA primarily imposes obligations to protect 
the privacy of electronic communications and that “[d]isclosure is 
permitted only as an exception to those primary obligations and is 
subject to conditions imposed in [section] 2703.”47 Thus, although the 
SCA does prescribe means by which law enforcement may obtain 
access to user content, “it does so in the context of a primary emphasis 
on protecting user content,” which the court described as the “object 
of the statute’s solicitude.”48 The court mentioned in dicta that if the 
Act were truly focused on abetting law enforcement and disclosure, it 
would have instead created “a rebuttable presumption of law 
enforcement access to content premised on a minimal showing of 
legitimate interest.”49 But as the Court pointed out, “this is not what 
the Act does.”50 Thus, an examination of the Act’s structure prompted 
the Court to conclude that the interest of law enforcement in 
compelling disclosure is secondary to the protection of users’ privacy 
interests. 
3.  The Legislative History of the SCA 
Finally, the court referred to the Act’s legislative history, which 
indicated that when Congress passed the SCA as part of the broader 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986, its primary goal was 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267) (internal quotations omitted). 
 46. Id. at 218 (“Section 2701 . . . protects the privacy interests of users in many aspects of their 
stored communications from intrusion by unauthorized third parties. Section 2702 generally 
prohibits providers from knowingly divulging the contents of a communication that is in electronic 
storage subject to certain enumerated exceptions. Section 2703 governs the circumstances in which 
information associated with stored communications may be disclosed to the government, creating 
the elaborate hierarchy of privacy protections that we have described.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 217. 
 49. Id. at 218. 
 50. Id. 
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to protect user privacy in the context of new technology that required 
user interaction with service providers.51 The legislative history also 
revealed that, with regard to governmental access, “Congress sought 
to ensure that the protections traditionally afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment extended to the electronic forum.”52 While the Court 
acknowledged that “Congress did not overlook law enforcement needs 
in formulating the statute,” based on a report from the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, the Court found that those needs were not “the primary 
motivator[s] for the enactment.”53 
C.  The Second Circuit’s Conclusion 
Having determined that the SCA’s primary focus is on user 
privacy, the court concluded that the proposed execution of the 
warrant would constitute an unlawful extraterritorial application of the 
Act.54 Because the content subject to the warrant is stored in, and 
would be seized from, the Dublin datacenter, and because Microsoft 
must necessarily interact with the Dublin datacenter in order to retrieve 
the information, the court determined that “the conduct that falls 
within the focus of the SCA would occur outside the United States.”55 
While the court acknowledged that the Act’s focus on the 
customer’s privacy might imply that the customer’s actual location or 
citizenship would be relevant to the extraterritoriality analysis, it 
ultimately held that “the invasion of the customer’s privacy takes place 
under the SCA where the customer’s protected content is accessed,” 
or, in this case, “where it is seized by Microsoft, acting as an agent of 
the government.”56 Thus, although Microsoft has the capacity to 
access information stored on any one of its servers located abroad, 
obtaining such information necessarily implicates the foreign 
subsidiary that manages the server and, consequently, the laws of the 
foreign country in which the server is located.57 Therefore, the Second 
Circuit held the SCA warrant could not be used to lawfully compel 
 
 51. Id. at 201. 
 52. Id. at 219 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99–647, at 19). 
 53. Id. at 219. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 220. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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Microsoft to produce the contents of a customer’s e-mail account 
stored exclusively in Ireland.58 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
A.  Implications of the Second Circuit’s Ruling 
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision, U.S. companies 
have already begun storing their information in data centers located 
outside the United States’ territorial jurisdiction and beyond the reach 
of U.S. warrants.59 As one commentator points out: “[d]ata center 
operations have been booming for years, but there’s a new urgency in 
setting them up to help businesses establish a creative solution to 
privacy regulations.”60 Microsoft is not the only major internet service 
provider to make use of overseas data centers; companies such as 
Apple, Google, and Facebook already have substantial infrastructure 
in Ireland as well.61 If Congress does not take action, more and more 
companies will begin taking advantage of the Second Circuit’s 
decision. 
By preventing SCA warrants from reaching data stored abroad, 
the court’s decision functions as a substantial obstacle to the 
investigative efforts of law enforcement. As the magistrate judge who 
issued the warrant noted, it is quite easy for a wrongdoer to “mislead 
a service provider that has overseas storage facilities into storing 
content outside the United States.”62 Here, the Court condemned as 
unlawfully extraterritorial the government’s attempt to compel a 
U.S.-based service provider to surrender information that is accessible 
from its U.S. facilities. Because the location of electronic documents 
is, “in important ways, merely virtual,”63 such an outcome seems 
wholly incongruous. But despite the apparent illogicality of the 
Court’s ruling, all things considered, the Second Circuit’s decision 
was the optimal one. 
 
 58. Id. at 221. 
 59. Stephen Dockery, Data Localization Takes Off as Regulation Uncertainty Continues, 
WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/06/06/data- localization 
-takes-off-as-regulation-uncertainty-continues. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Kate Conger, Microsoft Triumphs in Warrant Case Against U.S. Government, TECH 
CRUNCH (July 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/14/microsoft-wins-second-circuit-
warrant. 
 62. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 221. 
 63. Id. at 229 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
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B.  The Second Circuit Correctly Determined the Scope of the SCA’s 
Warrant Provision 
The Second Circuit correctly applied the Stored Communications 
Act in Microsoft Corp.; however, the statute is antiquated and does not 
present a workable framework for similar disputes in the future. 
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Gerald E. Lynch emphasized the 
need for congressional action to revise a badly outdated statute.64 As 
Judge Lynch explained, “there are significant practical and policy 
limitations on the desirability of” “undertaking to regulate conduct 
that occurs beyond our borders.”65 Given the possibility of serious 
diplomatic repercussions, “the decision about whether and when to 
apply U.S. law to actions occurring abroad is a question that is left 
entirely to Congress.”66 This is because, as the majority noted, 
“Congress, rather than the courts, has the facilities necessary to make 
policy decisions in the delicate field of international relations.”67 Here, 
the Court was careful not to overstep its mandate by usurping the role 
of Congress and rightfully declined to give the warrant extraterritorial 
effect. 
Although the government’s position in this case seems logical as 
a matter of policy, an opposite outcome could have had serious 
negative implications. As Alan Raul and Kwaku Akowuah observed, 
“the Court was sensitive to issues of consistency and reciprocity 
between U.S. and foreign states.”68 Consistency and reciprocity are 
significant concerns within the context of the present case. Some 
experts worry that “if the U.S. insists on the power to force transfer of 
data to the U.S. from foreign servers, other countries—including those 
more aggressive than the U.S.—will insist on a reciprocal right. This 
could, of course, diminish the privacy rights of Americans.”69 
Limiting law enforcement officials’ access to information may make 
it more difficult for them to adequately protect citizens. However, 
given the vast amount of user data managed by internet service 
providers and the recent uptick in cyber-attacks on multinational 
 
 64. Id. at 222. 
 65. Id. at 225. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 210 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
 68. Alan Raul & Kwaku Akowuah, 2nd Cir. Microsoft Ruling: A Plea For Congressional 
Action, LAW 360 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/aa0bdaf4-c3bd-4c87-
a786-a26308a8c8be/?context=1000516. 
 69. Id. 
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corporations, the interest in protecting user privacy is of the utmost 
importance and deserves serious consideration. 
Moreover, as Judge Lynch acknowledged, there is no evidence 
that Congress has ever formally weighed the costs and benefits of 
authorizing court orders of the sort at issue in this case, primarily 
because “[t]he SCA became law at a time when there was no reason 
to do so.”70 This case highlights the profound tension between several 
conflicting interests: the legitimate needs of U.S. law enforcement to 
uphold the rule of law, the rights of foreign sovereigns to govern free 
from U.S. intervention, and the privacy interests of U.S. citizens who 
engage in on-line activity. Given the seriousness of the interests at 
stake, Congress should be the one to decide “whether the benefits of 
permitting subpoena-like orders of the kind issued here outweigh the 
costs of doing so.”71 
In short, the Second Circuit’s decision should not be regarded as 
a “rational policy outcome, let alone celebrated as a milestone in 
protecting privacy.”72 Rather, the holding functions as “a plea for 
Congress to hash out the right policy balance. . . ,”73 and symbolizes 
courts’ unwillingness to make such decisions. 
C.  Possible Solutions 
1.  Data Localization 
As a result of the Second Circuit’s decision, Congress may feel 
compelled to pass strict data localization rules that would require 
technology companies to store user data in datacenters located within 
the United States’ borders.74 Under such rules, U.S.-based service 
providers would be unable to evade legitimate attempts by U.S. law 
enforcement to access customers’ information simply by storing that 
information in overseas datacenters. However, the adoption of data 
localization rules—which effectively require data to be stored based 
on political considerations rather than technical efficiency—would 
“contribute to a trend of atomizing today’s global Internet into 
 
 70. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 231 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 233. 
 73. Raul, supra note 68. 
 74. Conger, supra note 61. 
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country-level networks.”75 Russia already imposes a strict data 
localization requirement, and in the last year alone more than twenty 
governments, including France and Brazil, have proposed similar 
legislation.76 As one commentator points out, “[f]or many 
[governments], the stated reason has been not domestic monitoring, 
but rather protection against foreign government spying.”77 While 
localization rules may seem politically advantageous, internet experts 
have long objected to the adoption of data localization rules on a 
number of grounds.78 
First, many experts have reservations as to whether localization 
rules actually afford users greater protection, since such laws 
effectively give local governments greater access to user data.79 One 
commentator likened data localization to “a Balkanization or 
splintering of the Internet.”80 The same commentator argued that 
localization “makes the public at large less secure,” because “[f]oreign 
countries may not respect the laws governing security, resulting in 
more access by state-sponsored surveillance or espionage.”81 As a 
result, a data localization requirement in the United States would 
“pose risks to political activists and human rights defenders by making 
their information more accessible to authorities.”82 
Second, critics argue that data localization laws would effectively 
act as barriers to trade by placing a substantial burden on global 
service providers in the form of increased costs.83 For example, PayPal 
was forced to suspend its operations in Turkey after the Turkish 
government demanded that PayPal localize its infrastructure in order 
to continue operating.84 Ramsey Homsany, general counsel of the file-
 
 75. Katharine Kendrick, Risky Business: Data Localization, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2015, 5:08 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/02/19/risky-business-data-localization/#155d6f5 
38c8b. 
 76. Conger, supra note 61. 
 77. Kendrick, supra note 75. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Jocelyn Dong, Silicon Valley Tech Execs: Surveillance Threatens Digital Economy, PALO 
ALTO WEEKLY (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2014/10/09/tech-execs-
surveillance-is-harming-digital-economy. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Kendrick, supra note 75. 
 83. Dong, supra note 80. 
 84. Emre Peker, PayPal to Exit Turkey After Regulator Denies Payments License, WALL ST. 
J. (May 31, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/paypal-to-exit-turkey-after-regulator-denies-
payments-license-1464720574. 
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hosting service Dropbox, has said that the cost of setting up data 
centers across the globe would be prohibitively high—even for an 
established company like Dropbox.85 According to Homsany, 
adoption of the data localization rules proposed by twenty foreign 
governments would dramatically restrict entrepreneurship and limit 
competition by making it “impossible” to start new technology 
companies.86 Thus, adopting a data localization requirement would be 
imprudent because it would stifle innovation and economic growth. 
Third, the fragmentation of the internet would inhibit the 
dissemination of data and lead to greater inefficiency. According to 
one article, “Colin Stretch, general counsel of Facebook, said that 
service to users would become less efficient, slower and less 
personalized because of companies’ inability to take advantage of 
cloud-based storage that a well-networked Internet enables.”87 
Richard Bennett, the vice-chair of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Standards Association, explains that 
“[compliance] with data localization mandates not only requires more 
servers, it also requires more synchronization activity, which in turn 
requires more transmission capacity. This leads to a more complex 
Internet overall, which raises issues for Internet reliability.”88 Benett 
argues that no matter how “well-intentioned data localization 
mandates may be, over-broad restrictions on trans-border data flows 
are harmful to national security, destructive to the growth of the 
Internet, inconsistent with innovation, and bad for every user or firm 
who depends on the reliability of the Internet.”89 Therefore, Congress 
should resist the urge to implement strict data localization rules. 
2.  Strengthening Existing Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
Some have also suggested enhancing the mutual legal assistance 
treaty process.90 The term “mutual legal assistance treaty,” or MLAT, 
refers to a category of treaties, generally bilateral, under which the 
United States and another country agree to use their respective legal 
 
 85. Dong, supra note 80. Dropbox provides data storage services to roughly three hundred 
million users, “[seventy percent] of whom are outside the United States.” Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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processes to aid each other in the investigation and prosecution of 
criminal matters.91 The Irish government reportedly backed Microsoft 
in the present case, arguing that “the U.S. could pursue the data 
through existing treaties with Ireland rather than trying to circumvent 
the country’s sovereignty with a U.S.-based search warrant.”92 Thus, 
diplomatic engagement could potentially put the U.S. government in 
a position to sustain the interests of law enforcement and further 
international comity without sacrificing the privacy of millions of 
Americans. 
While some foreign nations have been reluctant to cooperate with 
the United States in such matters ever since Edward Snowden shed 
light on the NSA’s controversial surveillance activities,93 the United 
States and the European Union have taken major steps towards 
implementing the “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield,” which seeks to establish 
a safe framework for transatlantic data flows that will ensure greater 
protection for individuals and legal certainty for business.94 However, 
a number of countries in Europe and around the world have recently 
implemented localization regulations, which some believe were 
intended to protect their citizens against U.S. espionage.95 Thus, the 
U.S. must strive to engage foreign nations outside the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield and create an open dialogue; doing so will create opportunities 
for cooperation and potentially help restore trust in the U.S. 
government. If not, the U.S. government will be left with no formal 
means of garnering support to conduct law enforcement investigations 
in those countries with which it has not entered into an MLAT.96 Still, 
the benefits of mutual legal assistance treaty reform are unlikely to be 
realized in the short run because the negotiation process often moves 
quite slowly.97 Thus, the problem is one which also calls for legislative 
action. 
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3.  Proposed Statutory Reform 
While the U.S. must continue to pursue bilateral negotiations with 
foreign nations, Congress should seriously consider reforming the 
Stored Communications Act. Multinational service providers should 
not have the power to unlawfully obstruct the investigative efforts of 
the U.S. Justice Department and burden its ability to pursue matters 
related to domestic security. At the same time, the Justice Department 
must follow appropriate procedures that are substantively fair, “for it 
is procedure that marks . . . the difference between rule by law and rule 
by fiat.”98 
Pursuant to the government’s argument in the present case, one 
possibility would be for Congress to submit legislation that would 
enable a duly authorized prosecutor to lawfully obtain a modified SCA 
warrant having extraterritorial effect.99 Such an instrument would 
hypothetically compel a recipient to produce electronically stored 
information located on an overseas server that is under its control, 
even when the recipient is “merely a caretaker for another individual 
or entity and that individual, not the subpoena recipient, has a 
protectable privacy interest in the item.”100 But as one expert noted, 
“[i]f the U.S. government’s position was validated by the Second 
Circuit, it would have forced multinational companies such as 
Microsoft to violate the laws of Ireland and potentially other countries 
in the future to comply with U.S. law.”101 
Therefore, if the modified SCA warrant does not comply with an 
existing MLAT treaty or multilateral agreement, the recipient of such 
an instrument may be forced to choose between violating a U.S. court 
order and being held in contempt, and violating the law of the foreign 
country in which it also does business. As one commentator notes, 
“[t]his would be an untenable position for not just Microsoft but any 
international company that has operations and customers in the U.S. 
and around the world.”102 On one hand, many multinational internet 
service providers would almost certainly comply with a U.S. court 
order, even if it meant violating the data export laws of a foreign 
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sovereign, in order to continue to avail themselves of access to U.S. 
markets and the protection of the U.S. rule of law. Nonetheless, it 
would be unwise as a matter of economic policy for Congress to put 
these businesses in such a position, because doing so would inhibit 
U.S. tech-startups from expanding their operations to foreign markets 
and might also deter foreign tech companies from expanding to the 
U.S.103 Such a policy would erode the U.S. tax base for both foreign 
and domestic-source income. Therefore, any proposed legislative 
reform regarding the international reach of the SCA’s warrant 
provision will necessarily require lawmakers to take into account the 
interests of other sovereign nations. 
Many are hopeful that the Second Circuit’s decision will inspire 
“cooperative efforts among government officials, service providers 
and privacy advocates” to solve the many issues surrounding 
international data storage and government access to electronically 
stored information.104 While there have been a handful of unsuccessful 
attempts to modernize the SCA in the recent past, several members of 
Congress recently proposed legislation that would modernize the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).105 
In May, a bipartisan group of senators proposed the International 
Communications Privacy Act (“ICPA”), which would allow the use of 
domestic search warrants to retrieve electronic communications of 
U.S. citizens, permanent residents and some foreign nationals, 
wherever the individuals and content are located.106 This sort of 
bright-line rule would provide clearer guidance to courts applying the 
law. Moreover, the proposed ICPA would “[r]eform the MLAT 
process by providing greater accessibility, transparency, and 
accountability.”107 Although the legislative process can be quite 
arduous, commentator Bradley Shear is confident that “[t]he U.S. as 
the birthplace of the Internet is perfectly situated to serve as a model 
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for the rest of the world on how to properly balance digital privacy 
with lawful access.”108 However, it is imperative that Congress act 
sooner than later. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Microsoft case illustrates the challenges that courts face in 
applying an antiquated statute to contemporary issues concerning 
privacy and technology. Congress must act to implement a revised 
regulatory framework that is specifically tailored to the modern digital 
landscape. Strict data localization requirements are incongruous with 
achieving this end, because such policies fail to account for the 
complexities of today’s global system of interdependent networks. 
Any attempt at legislative reform must take into account the needs and 
priorities of foreign sovereign nations and aim to streamline the 
existing MLAT process. Unless and until Congress replaces the Stored 
Communications Act, courts faced with situations like the one in the 
present case will inevitably reach similarly perverse results. 
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